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Reuschlein Lecture
LYING TO PROTECT PRIVACY
ANITA L. ALLEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS Article has two aims. The first aim is to identify clearly, for discus-
sion and debate, the competing normative perspectives about lying
and sexual privacy that lurk behind public opinion about the prosecution
of perjury and related forms of deception. The second aim is to frame a
defense of one such perspective: namely that lying, and in particular, ly-
ing to protect sexual privacy, is not a categorical moral wrong-not even
when the liar is a high-ranking public official. This moral perspective does
not plainly entail that officials should conceal sex crimes, lie to the public
or lie under oath. It does, however, give those with discretion about pur-
suing the indictment, prosecution, impeachment, censure or resignation
of a liar a reason to treat lies about sex differently than other kinds of lies.
My defense of lying to protect sexual privacy is based on the premise
that privacy is a human need and moral entitlement, akin to freedom and
equality. Three decades of reflection and observation by philosophers
and psychologists inform this premise.' In the North American context,
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. J.D., Harvard Law
School; Ph.D., University of Michigan. This article was presented as the inaugural
Reuschlein Lecture at Villanova University School of Law. I am grateful to Dean
Mark Sargent and the students, faculty and alumni of Villanova University School
of Law for their gracious support.
1. For a discussion of the value of various forms of privacy, see generally Anita
L. Allen, Constitutional Law and Privacy [hereinafter Allen, Constitutional Law], in A
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 139 (Dennis Patterson ed.,
1996); Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values [hereinafter Al-
len, Genetic Privacy], in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIAL-
ITY IN THE GENETIC EPA 31 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997); Anita L. Allen, The
Jurispolitics of Privacy [hereinafter Allen, Jurispolitics of Privacy], in RECONSTRUCTING
POLITICAL THEORY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 68 (Mary Lyndon Shanley & Uma
Narayan eds., 1997); Anita Allen, Privacy [hereinafter Allen, Privacy], in A COMPAN-
ION TO FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 456 (Alison M. Jagger & Iris Young eds., 1998); Anita
L. Allen, Privacy in Health Care [hereinafter Allen, Privacy in Health Care], in 4 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 2064 (Warren T. Reich ed., rev. ed. 1995); ANITA L. ALLEN,
UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988) [hereinafter ALLEN,
(161)
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privacy is not a mere luxury or an optional good. Lying about sex has
evolved as one way well-meaning people from all walks of life cope with
the interplay of conflicting physical, emotional and social imperatives.
Therefore, lying about sex is something Americans should not condemn
too quickly or categorically.
Lying to protect privacy is not always a morally acceptable departure
from the general principle of truthfulness. For example, when the sup-
posed "sexual privacy" at issue concerns rape, incest, child molestation,
sexual harassment or exploitation, privacy is no excuse or justification for
lying. Any plausible defense of lying to protect privacy will have to be
qualified.
My qualified defense of lying to protect sexual privacy is consistent
with the widespread moral belief and religious doctrine that lying some-
times is a morally justifiable response to others seeking information to
which they have no right. 2 Lying to a would-be murderer about the where-
abouts of the would-be victim hoping thereby to thwart a crime is the right
thing to do. Lying to the unjust, however, is not always the morally best
alternative. Lying to a would be "busy-body" to thwart an ordinary inva-
UNEASY ACCESS]; RICHARD C. TURKINGTON ET AL., PRIVACY: CASES AND MATERIALS
(1992); Anita L. Allen, The Power of Private Facts, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757 (1991)
[hereinafter Allen, Power of Private Facts]; Anita L. Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy and the
Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1759 (1988) [hereinafter Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy]; Anita
L. Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection Fix for Abortion Law: Reflections on Citizenship,
Gender, and the Constitution, 18 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 419 (1995) [hereinafter
Allen, Proposed Equal Protection Fix]; Anita L. Allen, Rethinking the Rule Against Corpo-
rate Privacy Rights: Some Conceptual Quandaries for the Common Law, 20 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 607 (1987) [hereinafter Allen, Rethinking the Rule]; Anita L. Allen, Taking
Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 461
(1987) [hereinafter Allen, Taking Liberties]; Anita L. Allen, Tribe's Judicious Femi-
nism, 44 STAN. L. REv. 179 (1991) [hereinafter Allen, Judicious Feminism]; Anita L.
Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy Got Its Gender, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 441 (1990).
2. See Alasdair Maclntyre, Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers: What Can
We Learn from Mill and Kant?, in 16 THE TANNER LECrURES OF HuMAN VALUES 307,
342 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1995) (quoting Kant's rejection of Benjamin Con-
stant's view that "'to tell the truth is a duty only towards a person who has the right
to the truth"'). The view that it is morally permissible to lie to someone who has
no right to the information sought is not new. Immanuel Kant assessed it 200
years ago in his ethical writings on the subject of lying from benevolent motives.
See id.
The religious view that it is morally permissible to lie to someone who has no
right to the information to protect privacy is not new either. See Perez Zagorin, The
Historical Significance of Lying and Dissimulation, 63 Soc. REs. 863, 866, 873-74, 883,
896-904 (1996) (arguing that Islam and Judaism of Marranos permitted outward
lies about inward faith to avoid religious persecution and that Catholicism permits
dissimulation in several contexts, including those contemplated by doctrine of
"mental reservation"). Eminent sixteenth century Catholic authority Martin de
Azpilcueta (called Dr. Navarrus) urged that the doctrine of mental reservation
would permit lying when responding to questioning by judges and other superiors.
See id. at 900 (stating that Navarrus's treatment of mental reservation permitted
wide latitude in its use); see also T. Slater, Mental Reservation, in THE CATHOLIC ENCY-
CLOPEDIA 195 (Charles G. Herbermann et al. eds., 1913) (explaining that Catholi-
cism permits lying to thwart serious harm to others).
[Vol. 44: p. 161
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sion of privacy in everyday life may not be the right thing to do either. A
passenger on a train has no right to ask a stranger traveling with a child
whether the child was adopted. And yet, because of the importance for
children of knowing the truth about their origins, and feeling good about
who they are, the stranger may be obligated to answer truthfully and
cheerfully. I want to suggest that in instances where lying in response to
prying is the morally best response, it is best due to the fundamental im-
portance of certain forms of privacy. Stressing the good of privacy rather
than the evil of snooping is my overall tactic.
The Clinton-Lewinsky affair forced the legal community and the gen-
eral public to confront the ethics of lying about sex.3 When allegations of
a sexual affair between President William Jefferson Clinton and former
White House intern Monica Lewinsky came to light in January 1998, a
series of important questions began to emerge.4 Lying by public officials
is a legitimate cause for concern. One of the most compelling arguments
against lying by government officials is that dishonesty by those in public
life potentially undermines trust in government. Moral philosopher Sis-
sela Bok advanced an eloquent version of this argument in a classic of
practical philosophy, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life,5 and
again in an editorial response to news of the Clinton-Lewinsky affair.6 Bok
made a strong general case against lying by public officials and profession-
als, with which I largely agree. Her response to Clinton's lies was to argue
that the societal need for the preservation of trust in public authority out-
shines the President's and Ms. Lewinsky's individual needs for privacy,
even if those needs were wrongfully discounted by the Independent Coun-
sel's approach to his investigation and report. 7
I am less persuaded than Bok that the public in fact experiences an
erosion of trust in public authority upon learning of deceit relating to
3. See Kenneth Starr, Referral to the United States House of Representatives Pursuant
to Title 28, United States Code, § 595(c), Submitted by the Office of the Independent Coun-
se4 Sept. 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 614815 [hereinafter Starr Report] (alleging
that President Clinton committed high crimes or misdemeanors that warrant re-
moval from office).
4. See Susan Schmidt et al., Clinton Accused of Urging Aide to Lie; Starr Probes
Whether President Told Woman to Deny Alleged Affair to Jones's Lauryers, WASH. POST,
Jan. 21, 1998, at Al (reporting on initiation of Starr's investigation of Clinton-
Lewinsky affair).
5. SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978)
[hereinafter BOK, LYING]; see F.G. BAILEY, THE PREVALENCE OF DECEIT 27 (1991)
(discussing Bok's truth-telling bias and reluctant acceptance of limited forms of
deception).
6. See Sissela Bok, Lies: They Come With Consequences, WASH. PosT, Aug. 23,
1998, at C1 [hereinafter Bok, Lies Come With Consequences] (creating case against
lying public officials).
7. See id. ("[M]any people have also been disturbed at what has seemed hu-
miliating, at time prurient, probing of the president's intimate affairs both by in-
vestigators and the media."); see also Neil A. Lewis, Judge Cites Possible Improper Leaks
by Starr Office, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 31, 1998, at A9 (reporting on Judge Johnson's deter-
mination that there had been improper leaks by Starr's office).
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consensual adult sex. If the Gary Hart debacle is evidence that I am
wrong, the Clinton impeachment may be evidence that I am right.8 Clin-
ton's high approval ratings in the wake of his stunning admissions of de-
ceit could be interpreted as evidence that ordinary people distinguish
between general deceptiveness in public roles, about which they are
mainly unsympathetic, and deceptiveness concerning sexual matters by
persons occupying public roles, about which they have some sympathy. I
suspect that had Gary Hart been better known to the American people at
the time of the "Monkey Business" monkey business, his presidential can-
didacy could have survived.9
Clinton's adultery was brought to the public's attention in porno-
graphic detail and by government officials associated with a rival political
party. A crucial possibility to explore, in response to concerns about gov-
ernment credibility, is that public trust in democratic government is as
much harmed or more harmed by governmental investigation and disclo-
sure of the raw intimacies of consensual adult sex and family life, as by the
lies officials tell in attempting to maintain personal privacy. As Orlando
Patterson exhorted in a New York Times editorial about the Clinton scan-
dal, privacy is a requirement of freedom. 10
But to whose freedom are we referring? In feminist thought, privacy
is greeted with ambivalence, precisely because typical men enjoy more
freedom than typical women. Feminists have warned that to advocate pri-
vacy aggressively is to advocate that men be allowed the freedom to
subordinate women behind closed doors. Religious fundamentalists can
make the analogous point that advocating privacy is advocating that men
and women be free to commit sinful and degrading acts behind closed
doors. Who wants to trumpet a President's privacy when that privacy is
used to secure "blowjobs" from much younger female subordinates? Crit-
ics of President Clinton cannot place consensual adult sex in the same
category as sexual harassment and rape. And yet sex between men and
women who are neither age nor status peers raises questions about the
very meaning and relevance of "consensual adult sex."
8. See Judy Mann, Terminal Stupidity, WASH. POST, May 6, 1987, at C3 (com-
menting on Gary Hart scandal). Gary Hart's front-running bid for the Democratic
nomination for the presidency came to an abrupt end after the publication of
photographs of Donna Rice sitting on his lap while they cruised overnight with
others on a boat called "Monkey Business." See id. Hart was also accused of adul-
tery and bad judgment. See Lois Romano & Marc Fisher, Donna Rice Declines Lime-
light, Canceling News Conference, WASH. POST, May 6, 1987, at A12 (discussing Gary
Hart's character in midst of political candidacy); Hart Admits That He Made a Mis-
take but Denies Tryst; Calls Story Misleading and False, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1987, at 1
[hereinafter Hart Admits Mistake] (same); Hart's Wife: 'He Does Not Lie,'SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., May 6, 1987, at Al (same).
9. See Hart Admits Mistake, supra note 8, at 1 (reporting on damage to Hart
campaign).
10. See Orlando Patterson, What is Freedom Without Privacy?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 1998, at Al (associating right to privacy with freedom and opining that one
requires other).
[Vol. 44: p. 161
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To countenance lying to protect sexual privacy is not to endorse ex-
ploitative sexual relationships. Lying to protect acts that harm others has
no morally protected status. The claim has been made that the Clinton-
Lewinsky relationship was either exploitative of Lewinsky in principle, due
to the age and power gaps, or exploitative of Lewinsky in fact, because, in
the context of a clandestine extra-marital affair, she performed oral sex on
the President without herself achieving orgasm, sometimes as the Presi-
dent spoke on the telephone to others. A standard retort has merit: Clin-
ton did not exploit Lewinsky because she was willing, over twenty-one,
ambitious, bright, affluent, sometimes sexually gratified and wielded sig-
nificant power in the relationship.
I am reluctant to describe the Clinton-Lewinsky affair as substantially
exploitative of Ms. Lewinsky. First, exploitation is a matter of degree. To a
degree, Clinton exploited Lewinsky. To a degree, Lewinsky also exploited
Clinton and the members of his staff whom she pressured to grant her
special privileges and access to the detriment of their own careers and
morals. Lewinsky was aggressive and persistent in her raunchy and roman-
tic relationship with Clinton. Yet, the "casting couch" is no longer a young
woman's only route to a rewarding career. Lewinsky knew that she was not
required to have sex with the President to obtain or retain employment in
government service or in the corporate sector. The second reason is that
the public does not know, cannot know and should not know enough
about the President's sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky to declare its
content as exploitative. The kinky encounters described in the Starr Re-
port sound like encounters lots of people in peer relationships enjoy.
II. LYING IS ORDINARY
Broadly defined, lying includes intentional falsification and deceitful
concealment.1 1 To lie is to make false statements or to conceal the truth
knowingly, voluntarily and with an intent to deceive. So defined, lying is a
perfectly ordinary event.12 People lie all the time. Liars lie, but they are
not alone. Ordinary people who value and practice a high degree of hon-
esty also lie. Some highly regarded professionals lie as a seeming require-
11. See BOK, LYING, supra note 5, at 13-16 (emphasizing intentionality in defi-
nition of lying); see also PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LIES: CLUES TO DECEIT IN THE MAR-
KETPLACE, POLITICS, AND MARRIAGE 25-42 (1985) [hereinafter EKMvtAN, TELLING LIES]
(emphasizing deceitfulness as characteristic of lying).
12. See BAILEY, supra note 5, at 68 ("The habit of protective concealment... is
ubiquitous, and there is nothing uncommon about it or about the accompanying
itch to penetrate the privacy of others."); CHARLES V. FORD, LIES!, LIES!!, LIES!!!:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECEIT 4 (1996) (commenting that everyone lies); DAVID Nv-
BERG, THE VARNISHED TRUTH: TRUTH TELLING AND DECEIVING IN ORDINARY LIFE 11
(1993) (stating that deception has unspoken role in everything we do); Bella M.
DePaulo et al., Lying in Everyday Life, 70 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 979,
993 (1996) (explaining that research subjects told several lies daily).
1999]
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ment of their work.1 3 Physicians and nurses lie to patients to ease their
distress.14 Social psychologists lie to research subjects in studies of human
behavior. 15 Law enforcement officials lie to criminal suspects to en-
courage cooperation and collect evidence. 16 Diplomats and government
bureaucrats lie to gain advantage over foreign governments in interna-
tional affairs. 17 Lawyers lawfully conceal truths unfavorable to their cli-
ents, for indeed, in the adversary system, "the very institutional framework
of a legal system may be used to hide the truth .... ,18
The frequency and significance of deception is not the same in every
segment of the population or for all personality types, but men, women
and children of all cultural and economic backgrounds lie. 19 Women,
who typically engage in a greater number of social interactions than men,
may lie more often than men.20 Small children may lie more often than
typical adults.2 1 Lying and related forms of deception "appear[ ] to be
normal rather than abnormal, a workaday attribute of practical intelli-
13. See Alan Ryan, Professional Liars, 63 Soc. REs. 620, 625-41 (1996) (illustrat-
ing that physicians, lawyers and politicians lie in professional contexts).
14. SeeJennifer Jackson, Telling the Truth, 17J. OF MED. ETHICS 5, 5-9 (1991)
(discussing how medical professionals lie).
15. See generally JAMES H. KORaN, ILLUSIONS OF Rurlv: A HISTORY OF DECEP-
TION IN SOCIL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1997) (discussing various ways social scientists
deceive their research subjects).
16. See NYBERG, supra note 12, at 185-88 (commenting on deception in police
work).
17. See W. Peter Robinson, Lying in the Public Domain, 36 AM. BEHAV. SCIENrIST
359, 362-65 (1993) [hereinafter Robinson, Lying in the Public Domain] (comment-
ing on lying in public affairs); see alsoJOHN ORMAN, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND DE-
CEPTION 7 (1980) (discussing lies and withholding of information to maintain
positive public persona).
18. Robinson, Lying in the Public Domain, supra note 17, at 366; see H. Richard
Uviller, The Lawyer as Liar, 13 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 2, 105 (1994) (opining that
"purely moral considerations do not invariably command strict honesty," but law-
yers' roles of influence "in the affairs of government, commerce, and the private
lives of the people" demand scrupulous attention to accuracy).
19. See LYING AND DECEPTION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21 (Michael Lewis & Carolyn
Saarni eds., 1993) [hereinafter LYING AND DECEPTION] (discussing deception in
non-Western cultures); W. PETER ROBINSON, DECEIT, DELUSION, AND DETECTION 77-
78, 169-74 (1996) [hereinafter ROBINSON, DECEIT] (same); Victor Znakov, Compre-
hension of Lies: A Russian View, in STATES OF MIND: AMERICAN AND POST-SOVIET
PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN PSYCHOLOGY 79-82 (Diane F. Halperin &
Alexander E. Voiskounsky eds., 1997) [hereinafter STATES OF MIND] (presenting
Russian view); Deborah A. Kashy & Bella M. DePaulo, Who Lies, 70J. OF PERSONAL-
ITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1037, 1037 (1996) ("Lying is a fact of social life rather than an
extraordinary or unusual event.").
20. See LYING AND DECEPTION, supra note 19, at 19-20, 126-47 (discussing sex
differences regarding frequency of lying); DePaulo et al., supra note 12, at 980-81
(commenting on sex differences in lying).
21. See ROBINSON, DECEIT, supra note 19, at 40-73 (discussing how and when
children learn to lie); Abigail F. Strichartz & Roger V. Burton, Lies and Truth: A
Study of the Development of the Concept, 61 CHILD DEV. 211, 211-20 (1990) (presenting
study of when children begin to use concepts of truth and deception).
[Vol. 44: p. 161
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss2/1
LYING TO PROTECT PRIVACY
gence."2 2 People who lie too much or too little strike us as unkind.23
Studies suggest that average Americans will admit to telling at least a
couple of lies a day, and actually tell more.24 Lying is frequent and perva-
sive because it works. Lying works because even experienced lie detectors
can distinguish lies from truth only about half the time.25 Not all lies work
though. There are many reasons why lies fail. 26 Our lies fail because they
are discovered or we give ourselves away through facial expression, de-
meanor or outright confession. 27
III. THE TRUTH-TELLING BIA.s IN WESTERN ETHICS
Despite the prevalence of lying, western moral traditions generally ad-
vocate truth-telling over lying. Secular moralists and theologians have
written extensively about the ideal and actual ethics of lying. 28 The Catho-
lic theological tradition consistently regards lying as a grave sin. The Cath-
olic doctrine does, however, appear to allow some untruthful assertions on
certain occasions. 29 The Jesuits are often associated with the doctrine of
"mental reservation." This permits one to speak falsely or misleadingly, so
22. NYBERG, supra note 12, at 1.
23. See, e.g., BAILEY, supra note 5, at 69 ("The correct answer [to '[h]ow are
you today?'] ... is 'Just Fine!' Privacy is a must, even in suffering. A sure way to
disconcert inquires is to tell them how in fact you are .... "). We expect people
whom we do not know well to lie to us about their health and suffering. See id.
(discussing lying to protect privacy).
24. See FOR), supa note 12, at 4 ("A book based on a poll of Americans...
claimed that 90% of the people polled admitted that they were deceitful. Lies...
included lying about one's ... sex life .... "); see also DePaulo et al., supra note 12,
at 984 ("College students reported lying in approximately one out of every three of
their social interactions, and people from the community lied in one out of every
five social interactions.").
25. See FORD, supra note 12, at 197-235 (discussing lie detectors).
26. See Paul Ekman, Deception, Lying, and Demeanor, in STATES OF MIND, supra
note 19, at 93, 99 [hereinafter Ekman, Deception] (commenting on reasons why lies
fail); Paul Ekman, Why Don't We Catch Liars?, 63 Soc. RES. 801, 808-16 (1996) [here-
inafter Ekman, Catch Liars] (same).
27. See generally E KmAN, TELLING LIES, supra note 11, at 80-161 (discussing how
lies are detected by body language and facial expressions); ROBINSON, DECEIT,
supra note 19, at 74-150 (same).
28. See generally BAILEY, supra note 5 (discussing ethics of lying); BOK, LYING,
supra note 5 (same); ALISON LEIGH BROWN, SUBJECTS OF DECEIT: A PHENOMENOL-
OGY OF LYING (1998) (same); MARCEL ECK, LIES AND TRUTH (1970) (same); TIMUR
KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE
FALSIFICATION (1995) (same); NYBERG, supra note 12 (same); LOYAL RUE, By THE
GRACE OF GUILE: THE ROLE OF DECEPTION IN NATURAL HISTORY AND HUMAN AF-
FAIRS (1994) (same); Robert C. Solomon, What a Tangled Web: Deception and Self-
Deception in Philosophy, in LYING AND DECEPTION, supra note 19, at 30-58 (same);
Mary Mothersill, Some Questions About Truthfulness and Lying, 63 Soc. RES. 913, 913-
41 (1996) (same); Bernard Williams, Truth, Politics, and Self-Deception, 63 Soc. RES.
603, 603-17 (1996) (same); Zagorin, supra note 2, at 863-912 (same).
29. See Zagorin, supra note 2, at 869-77, 897-904 (discussing Protestant Chris-
tian perspectives on dissimulation).
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long as one makes a mental note of the truth. 30 The standard example of
when this doctrine may apply is the situation in which a murderer comes
to your door looking.for someone you know to be at home. When asked if
the intended victim is at home, it is permissible to say that the intended
wictim is not, as long as you make a mental note that what you really mean
is that the intended victim is at home, but not for the purposes of the
murderer. The Catholic teaching is that you may lie or equivocate in this
situation because the truth is sought by someone whose unjust intentions
deny him or her the right to it.
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant advocated an absolute, cat-
egorical duty to speak the truth without regard to the consequences. 3 1 He
rejected the notion that it is just to lie to the unjust, pointing out that an
outcome worse than the one the liar hoped to avert could come about as a
consequence of the lie.32 For example, suppose you tell the murderer
that the intended victim is not at home, hoping to mislead the murderer
and send the murder on his or her way. Unknown to you, the victim is
climbing out of a side window, hoping to escape while you distract the
murderer. Relying on your lie, the murderer leaves the house, encounters
the victim attempting to escape and kills the victim. Had you told the
truth, the murderer might have come inside to search the house, giving
the victim time to complete an escape. 33
Most contemporary philosophers who have taken up the subject of
lying-F.G. Bailey,3 4 Sissela Bok,3 5 Christine Korsgaard, 36 David Nyberg,
3 7
30. See id. at 899 (describing Jesuit doctrine of "mental reservation").
31. See Christine M. Korsgaard, The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing With Evil, 15
PHIL. & PUB. AF. 325, 326 (1986) (stating that Kant endorsed claim that one must
never tell lies under any circumstances or for any purpose). But see MacIntyre,
supra note 2, at 344-45 (citing scholarship suggesting that Kant's views may have
been less extreme early in his career).
32. See Korsgaard, supra note 31, at 326 (describing two of Kant's examples of
person's lie causing less desirable consequences).
33. See Immanuel Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, in IMMAN-
UEL KANT: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 605, 613 (MaryJ. Gregored ed., 1996) ("To be
truthful in all declarations is therefore a sacred command of reason prescribing
unconditionally, one not to be restricted by any conveniences."); see also Kor-
sgaard, supra note 31, at 326-27 (discussing Kant's famous essay On Supposed Right to
Lie from Altruistic Motives and "murderer-at-the-door" hypothetical).
34. See BAILEY, supra note 5, at 13 (making point that wrongfulness of lie is
function of its consequences and liar's motivations).
35. See BOK, LYING, supra note 5, at 47-115 (discussing white lies, good excuses,
justification and crisis intervention).
36. See Korsgaard, supra note 31, at 330 ("It is permissible to lie to deceivers in
order to counteract the intended results of their deceptions .... ) .
37. See NYBERG, supra note 12, at 112-94 (emphasizing important role of de-
ception in civility, parenting, friendship, altruism and law enforcement).
[Vol. 44: p. 161
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Alasdair MacIntyre3 8 and Mary Mothersill, 39 to name a very few-have ar-
gued that the wrongness of lying is to some extent contingent upon the
circumstances. They typically conclude that, while lying is sometimes justi-
fiable, the better moral principle is that we should strive toward the high-
est possible degrees of honesty in our public and private lives. 40 We
should be honest in dealings with our friends, families, coworkers, fellow
citizens and government. We should also be honest with ourselves. 41 In
everyday life, judgments about the morality of particular instances of lying
seem to depend upon who is doing the lying (e.g., a friend, a child, a
thief), what the lying concerns (e.g., sex, health, business) and who is be-
ing lied to (e.g., a dying patient, a judge, a racketeer).
Why is truth-telling better as a rule than lying? Philosophers have ar-
gued that individuals should avoid lies to promote knowledge of the truth
about ourselves and others in important relationships, 4 2 to show respect
for moral persons' dignity as rational human beings and to achieve integ-
rity and self-respect.4 3 Experts also contend that "society is better if truth-
telling prevails as the rule in public and private affairs,"'44 for truth-telling
encourages the trust that is a basis for mutual reliance in commerce, gov-
ernment, social life and families.
4 5
38. See Maclntrye, supra note 2, at 357-58 ("Uphold truthfulness in all your
actions by being unqualifiedly truthful in all your relationships and by lying to
aggressors only in order to protect those truthful relationships against aggressors,
and even then only when lying is the least harm that can afford an effective de-
fense against aggression.").
39. See Mothersill, supra note 28, at 924-25 (discussing theory of consequen-
tialism, according to which wrongness of lie depends upon its consequences).
40. See BAILEY, supra note 5, at 27 (describing thesis that "[s]ociety is better if
truth telling prevails as the rule in public and private affairs"); MacIntyre, supra
note 2, at 357 (suggesting that people limit use of lies to instances in which they
are least harmful way to avoid aggression).
41. See David Shapiro, On the Psychology of Self-Deception, 63 Soc. REs. 785, 785-
99 (1996) (stating that costs of self-deception outweigh benefits); see also Williams,
supra note 28, at 615-16 (discussing collective self-deception among politicians, me-
dia and audiences and its effect of subverting real truth).
42. See MacIntyre, supra note 2, at 353-54 (stating that truthfulness in relation-
ships ought to be promoted because we need to learn of our own intellectual and
moral deficiencies, to have integrity as critics and to avoid corrupting power of
fantasy).
43. See Korsgaard, supra note 31, at 333 (noting that under Kantian perspec-
tive, coercion and deception are most fundamental forms of wrongdoing because
they cause others to be used for liar's ends without allowing them to choose freely
to contribute to liar's ends).
44. BAILEY, supra note 5, at 27.
45. See BOK, LYING, supra note 5, at 26-28, 31, 50, 95-97, 126-28, 142, 164, 176,
178 (stating that truthfulness lends to foundation of human relationships and that
institutions collapse when truthfulness is removed).
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IV. MOTIVES FOR LYING
If truth-telling is so valuable, why do people lie? And why is all lying
not clearly wrong? There appear to be a number of distinct reasons or
motives for lying. Accounting for why people lie has been a recurrent
concern of philosophers. 46 Motives matter to philosophers' moral assess-
ment of lying because "we react very differently to identical actions if we
believe that they arise from very different motives." 4 7 It is one thing to lie
to prevent a murder, but it is something else to lie simply to pad a bank
account. Accounting for why people lie has also been a subject of particu-
lar interest to social psychologists. 48 After extensive empirical studies of
adults' and children's motives for lying, researcher Paul Ekman compiled
a list of nine different reasons people lie. According to Ekman, the most
common reasons people lie are to avoid punishment and to obtain re-
wards. People also lie to protect others from punishment, to protect
themselves and others from the threat of physical harm, to win admira-
tion, to get out of an awkward social situation, to avoid embarrassment, to
maintain privacy and to exercise power over others.49 Of special interest
to this Article is the eighth reason on Ekman's list-people lie to maintain
their privacy. Philosopher David Nyberg has also expressly recognized the
privacy motive, noting that "we have learned to use deception ... to gain
and protect privacy."'50
46. See, e.g., Maclntyre, supra note 2, at 314 (describing treatment of lying
from time of Socrates through modern era).
47. Ekman, Catch Liars, supra note 26, at 83.
48. See, e.g., ECK, supra note 28, at 59-78 (stating that all lying is done with
deceptive purpose and that lying should be judged by intention that motivates it);
FoRD, supra note 12, at 88-102 (describing 13 motivations for lying that may exist
singly or in combination); RUE, supra note 28, at 144 (stating that persons some-
times employ deception to achieve personal wholeness); De Paulo et al., supra note
12, at 979-80 (noting that many goals that motivate nondeceptive communication
also motivate deceptive communication); Wendy Doniger, Sex, Lies, and Tall Tales,
63 Soc. REs. 663, 663-99 (1996) (discussing deception in sexual behavior of
humans); Ekman, Catch Liars, supra note 26, at 98 (listing reasons people lie);John
Hollander, The Shadow of a Lie: Poetry, Lying, and the Truth of Fictions, 63 Soc. REs.
643, 643-61 (1996) (stating that liars always perceive some advantage in telling lie);
Kashy & DePaulo, supra note 19, at 1037-38 (suggesting that person's motives for
lying have correlation with person's personality); Robinson, Lying in the Public Do-
main, supra note 17, at 359-82 (discussing motivations of public figures to lie to
public); Ryan, supra note 13, at 620 (analyzing lie told between spouses for pur-
poses of saving marriage); Leonard Saxe, Thoughts of an Applied Social Psychologist,
46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 409, 412-13 (1991) (reviewing studies of conditions that com-
pel individuals to lie or tell truth); Shapiro, supra note 41, at 785-800 (discussing
causes and effects of self-deception); Strichartz & Burton, supra note 21, at 211-20
(studying children's conceptions of lies and truth); Uviller, supra note 18, at 102-05
(discussing forces motivating lawyers to lie in violation of disciplinary rules).
49. See Ekman, Deception, supra note 26, at 98 (describing motives that
emerged from interview data).
50. NYBERG, supra note 12, at 1. Nyberg wrote:
A life without privacy is unthinkable. How could we make love? Reflect
or meditate? Write a poem, keep a diary, daydream? How could we at-
tend to those sometimes highly self-conscious requirements of skin and
10
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Lying to maintain privacy is a complex motive, for there are several
distinguishable dimensions of privacy a person might seek to secure
through deception. Dimensions of physical, informational, decisional and
proprietary privacy all can be furthered by lying. 51 An adulterer, like Pres-
ident Clinton, might lie, first, to conceal his affair; second, to conceal the
trysts themselves; third, to maintain a sense of independence-a sense of
being free, autonomous and able to make one's own decisions about sex,
love and intimacy without unwanted interference; and fourth, to preserve
the dignitarian interests and any economic interests in good name and
reputation. Three of the four dimensions of privacy protected by the lying
adulterer merit further comment.
First, a person might lie, for better or for worse, to maintain informa-
tional privacy. The person might lie seeking to keep private confidential
or secret information about a sexual relationship, as in the case of Presi-
dent Clinton; information about a medical ailment, as in the case of tennis
great Arthur Ashe, who managed to conceal his AIDS from the public for
some time;52 information about financial affairs, as in the case of the for-
mer Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Henry Cisneros, who
lied to the FBI in a background check about tens of thousands of dollars
he paid to an ex-mistress. 5 3 People also lie to protect the privacy of infor-
mation about their families, as in the bizarre case of Judge James Ware of
San Jose, who hid information about his uninteresting family back-
ground.54 Judge Ware repeatedly lied in professional settings, claiming
that as a child living in Alabama he had suffered through a vicious hate
bowels? How could we expect to keep our intimate doings out of the
newspaper? How could we pay adequate attention to our personal inner
worlds, or find peace from the demands of daily living? We need a cer-
tain amount of privacy to maintain a sense of dignity and decency, to stay
sane and happy. Civility itself requires privacy.
Id. at 129. Nyberg also wrote that:
Privacy conveys advantage in achieving and maintaining a reputation, the
difficulty of which for pubic figures is symbolized both by the highly pros-
perous gossip industry and by an increasing number of scandalous
demeaning congressional hearings. The advantage of privacy extends be-
yond private life, to the world of employment, where competition for
jobs, promotions, and other business associations is keen and mean.
Id.
51. See Allen, Genetic Privacy, supra note 1, at 33 (recognizing and explicating
four basic categories of privacy).
52. See Why Arthur Ashe Kept it Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1992, at A36 (stating
that Arthur Ashe "felt obliged" to keep his illness secret for fear that he and his
family would suffer social stigma if it was revealed that he had AIDS).
53. See DavidJohnston, March 12-18: Drip, Drip of Scandal-Cisneros Is on the Spot;
Pena Is off the Hook, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1995, at 2E (describing how Cisneros's lies
to FBI during his background check were revealed when his former mistress pro-
duced secretly recorded tapes of her conversations with Cisneros).
54. See Harriet Chiang, Federal Judge in San Jose Publicly Reprimanded for Lying,
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 19, 1998, at A17 (describing Judge James Ware's public repri-
mand by panel of nine federal judges from throughout western states); Reynolds
Holding, Family Accepts Judge's Apology for Lie, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 11, 1997, at A2
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crime perpetrated against his brother. At first, Judge Ware lied to gain
sympathy and attention rather than informational privacy, but then, as
time passed, he needed to continue his lies to keep the truth of his dull
background from being exposed. Former Labor Secretary Robert Reich
tactfully lied about the miserably low esteem in which he held others while
he served in the Clinton Administration. Only after the publication of his
notoriously inaccurate tell-all book, Locked in the Cabinet,55 did the bulk of
his former Washington associates learn Reich's true impressions. 56
Second, lies can protect opportunities for physical privacy, like soli-
tude and trysts. When President Clinton told White House staff members
that he was receiving Ms. Lewinsky into the Oval Office to examine the
papers or accept the pizza she pretended to deliver, lying was a way of
getting time alone for intimacy.
57
Third and finally, lying can be motivated by a desire to conceal and
facilitate independent choices relating to aspects of life that we usually tag
"private." People commonly lie to protect their independence.58 In consti-
tutional law, privacy often signifies independence or autonomy. Philoso-
phers and psychologists who talk about lying to protect independence
often have in mind the very same things that we in the legal community
have in mind when we talk about the decisional privacy of the abortion
choice or the decisional privacy of a terminally ill patient electing to termi-
nate life-support. 59 President Clinton's lies to friends and aids about the
(recounting story of howJudge Ware falsely claimed to be brother of Alabama boy
with same last name who was slain by racists).
55. ROBERT B. REICH, LOcKED IN THE CABINET (1997).
56. See id. at ix (explaining, in Reich's own words, his reasons for writing book
and his apologies to colleagues described in book who might feel "ill-served" by his
account of them); see also Al Kamen, Drawing a Blank, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1998,
at W4 (describing Reich's book as being "skewered for inaccuracies, misquotations
and fabrications"); Diane E. Lewis, Critics Contend Reich's Book Pits Perception vs. Real-
ity, BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 1997, at F1 (noting that since publication of Reich's
book, "A firestorm of criticism has accused the author of fabricating many of the
depicted events").
57. See Starr Report, supra note 3, at 85 ("I would pass by the office with some
papers and then . . .he would sort of stop me and invite me in.").
58. See FORD, supra note 12, at 88-89 (noting that desire for independence
may drive people to lie). Ford also states that:
[Pleople who react strongly to control or intrusiveness from others may
resort to lying in an effort to maintain a sense of independence .... [The
behavior of] a young lawyer who repeatedly engaged in extramarital af-
fairs.., had a compulsive quality about it .... Through the process of
psychotherapy, it became apparent that this young man was using his sex-
ual liaisons as a means of maintaining a secret life and a sense of autono-
mous maleness .... His deceitful behavior ... was motivated... by the
need for psychological independence.
Id. at 89.
59. See Allen, Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 148-50 (noting that some
scholars would exclude "autonomous decision making" from definition of privacy;
however, "the idea of decisional privacy [has taken hold] in ordinary language,
philosophy, and constitutional jurisprudence"); Allen, Privacy in Health Care, supra
[Vol. 44: p. 161
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nature of his relationship with Miss Lewinsky were designed to allow him
the freedom to continue a relationship of which he knew most others
would disapprove on moral or prudential grounds.
I am primarily interested in the most self-focused kind of lying for
privacy-lying to protect one's own privacy. It is worth noting, however,
that people also lie to protect the privacy of others. They lie attempting to
conceal facts about others' affairs. President Clinton's secretary, Betty
Currie, may have done this.60 We lie sometimes to protect members of
our families, our friends or our lovers. 61 We may also lie because we be-
lieve that we have a professional duty to guard zealously the confidentiality
of personal, business, legal and medical information about other people.
V. LYING ABOUT SEX: WALKING ON THE "WILDE" SIDE
People lie about sex. Indeed, as the television comedians say, people
lie during sex. That people lie to avoid disclosure of facts about their sex
lives and to enjoy sexual independence is a reality observed in everyday life
that psychologists have studied and confirmed. In light of the current di-
verse mix of sexual mores, public officials may decide that carefully con-
cealing their sex lives is essential to the freedom and intimacy they
understandably crave. Immediately after President Clinton confirmed his
improper relationship with Monica Lewinsky, Americans were eager to un-
derstand two rather remarkable phenomena: that intelligent people, who
know they will be scrutinized, undertake the kinds of sex lives about which
they will probably have to lie; and that these same intelligent people some-
times lie in such sloppy and public ways that their lies can be uncovered
easily and with disastrous consequences.
note 1, at 2065-67 (discussing decisional privacy in health care context and noting
that "[d] ecisional privacy rights in the law presuppose a private sphere of conduct
immune from state or federal regulation"); Allen, Proposed Equal Protection Fix,
supra note 1, at 440 (describing decisional privacy concept within constitutional
law).
60. See Starr Report, supra note 3, at 112-13 (stating that "Ms. Currie helped
keep the relationship secret" by persuading Secret Service to not record Monica
Lewinsky's visits to President Clinton and by avoiding writing down messages from
Monica Lewinsky to President). According to the Starr Report, Betty Currie served
as a confidential "go between" for President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky (e.g., on
March 29, 1997 and May 24, 1997, the President also apparently asked Betty Currie
to try to find Lewinsky a White House job). See id. at 119, 123-24 (recounting
events on date when Lewinsky had last sexual encounter with President and date
when President officially ended relationship with Lewinsky).
61. Cf Margaret Morganroth Gullette, Why Women Won't Join the War on Clin-
ton, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 21, 1998, at A15 (describing privacy as sound motive for
lying). Gullette noted:
Personally, if my husband had had an affair and been coerced into testify-
ing about it, I would want him to lie in public and struggle to keep it
secret as long as he could. Our right to privacy-which means my pri-
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Before President Clinton scandalized Washington, Oscar Wilde scan-
dalized London. 62 The two men merit comparison. A famous lecturer,
wit and playwright, Oscar Wilde had a complex and troubling sex life. He
was married and fathered children by his wife, Constance. While married,
he undertook a series of three homosexual relationships with other art-
ists. 63 He also engaged in sex and sex-play (voyeurism) with numerous
other men. 64 Wilde lied to his wife and many of his associates about his
sexual practices. Wilde was remarkably reckless about the lies he told, lies
that might otherwise have vouchsafed his identity and freedom. On the
one hand, he often made efforts to keep his illicit romantic and sexual
affairs secret, particularly from his wife and children. On the other hand,
he freely and openly associated with well-known homosexuals, advocates
of homosexual tolerance at Oxford and with notorious and flamboyant
homosexuals and indiscreet young male prostitutes in London and
abroad.6 5
That Wilde lied can be looked upon with a certain amount of sympa-
thy given the severe legal penalties for open homosexuality in Wilde's
time. Why, however, was Wilde willing to risk criminal prosecution? Why
was he not deterred by the harshness of the law? It was fairly safe, if one
was discreet, to be an educated, upperclass homosexual. Wilde knew that
most homosexuals were not exposed and prosecuted in London. More
importantly, Wilde may have felt that sexual risks were worth taking if they
allowed him to live more authentically. His identity and freedom were
diminished by a life restricted to conventional heterosexual marriage. 66
62. See generally RICHARD ELLMANN, OSCAR WILDE (1988) (describing scandal-
ous life of Oscar Wilde in nineteenth century England).
63. See id. at 307 (describing Wilde's early homosexual relationship with artist
John Gray). Wilde's series of lovers also included Andre Gide. See id. at 355 (de-
picting Gide as being "enraptured" with Wilde). The lover who ultimately led to
Wilde's ruin though was the Lord Alfred (Bosie) Douglas. See id. at 389 (describ-
ing relationship between Wilde and Douglas as "intense and romantic" although
not monogamous).
64. See id. at 389-91 (describing series of men with whom Wilde had
relationships).
65. See id. (commenting on Wilde's open homosexual relationships).
66. See id. at 435 ("[Wilde's] life with Douglas, including the publicity of their
romantic passion, reflected his intention to oblige a hypocritical age to take him as
he was."). Ellmann speculates that:
The excitement of doing something considered wrong, and the [vices of]
faithless boys ... may have been as important for Wilde as sexual gratifi-
cation.... English society tolerated homosexuality only so long as one
was not caught at it. His chances of being caught were enormously in-
creased as he combined casual associations with his more idealized ones
.... Wilde believed in his star .... But he was always bringing himself to
the brink.
Id. at 390-91. Michel Foucault observed that "we now know that it is sex itself
which hides the most secret parts of the individual: the structure of his fantasies,
the roots of his ego, the forms of his relationship to reality. At the bottom of sex,
there is truth." Doniger, supra note 48, at 664. If there is truth in sex, there is
surely the most truth in the sex that is most authentic. But see id. at 665-76 (argu-
[Vol. 44: p. 161
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While still officially denying homosexuality, Wilde virtually aban-
doned his wife and children in favor of living with the handsome, petulant
and self-centered poet, Lord Alfred Douglas. Douglas's father, the Mar-
quess of Queensberry, disapproved of his son's relationship with Wilde
and demanded in vain that Wilde break things off. Prodded by Lord
Douglas, Wilde took lying about sex to extraordinary heights when he
brought a defamation action against Queensberry. 67
Wilde's great folly was to sue a powerful opponent and to bring libel
charges that he could only defend by easily disproved lies. The libel alle-
gations focused on a hateful note Douglas's father scrawled on the back of
a card left for Wilde at Wilde's club. Queensberry and his lawyers main-
tained that the Marquess's note described Wilde as a man "posing as a
Somdomite [sic]. '68 So far as Wilde and Lord Douglas were concerned,
the note condemned Wilde as a sodomite.69 In defamation actions, truth
is obviously a defense. The Marquess's lawyers had no trouble rounding
up male prostitutes willing to testify against Wilde. 70 They secured hotel
staff willing to testify to finding men in Wilde's bed and fecal stains on
Wilde's bed sheets. 71 Thus, Wilde's futile attempt at a face-saving lawsuit
against Queensberry led to his conviction for sodomy and sentencing to
two grueling years of hard labor, a sentence that broke his health and
ruined and shortened his life. 7 2
With lies we desperately try to preserve our freedom and our identi-
ties-our actual identities rather than the masks we must wear as a price of
admission to conventional mainstream society. Wilde went too far in try-
ing to protect his life as an eccentric gay artist, much as President Clinton
went too far in trying to protect his life as a daring ladies' man. Clinton
recklessly engaged in a clandestine extra-marital sexual affair with Lewin-
sky and then boldly lied about that fact on national television and in pri-
vate meetings with his closest friends and confidants. Like Wilde, Clinton
allowed himself to become smitten with a self-centered young lover and
ing that sexual love is inherently deluding). The sexual act is the ultimate key to
concealed identity. See id. at 664 (observing that, according to Bible stories, great
literature and Freud, sex is "the most reliable criterion of personal identity"). The
true self is revealed in the physical act of sex and in the spiritual act of falling in
love. See id. (noting distinction between physical sex and falling in love).
67. See ELLMANN, supra note 62, at 439 (describing initiation of libel suit
against Marquess of Queensberry and quoting Wilde as saying, "'What is loath-
some to me is the memory of interminable visits paid by me to the solicitor ...
[where] I would sit with [a] serious face[ ] telling serious lies'").
68. Id. at 438.
69. See id. (describing impact that Queensberry's note had on Wilde).
70. See id. at 441-42 (describing how detectives working for Queensberry un-
covered evidence against Wilde through female prostitute who complained about
competition for male clientele "from boys under the influence of Oscar Wilde").
71. See id. at 460 (describing testimony presented at trial against Wilde).
72. See BALLEY, supra note 5, at 37 (stating that "[t] he prospect of losing face is,
of course, apt to arouse nonrealistic sentiments, and a man can be moved to cut off
his nose to save his face").
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then entrusted his remarkable and historic career to an immature lover's
judgment. Like Wilde, Clinton wound up hurting and embarrassing his
family by an affair with a beautiful, younger and less gifted person. Like
Wilde, Clinton sought to turn the truth-tellers, whom he regarded as hav-
ing inappropriately pryed and distorted the truth, into moral monsters.
Wilde literally put Queensberry on trial, while Clinton tried, with some
success, to put Kenneth Starr and the Republican Congress on trial in the
minds of the American people. Like Wilde, Clinton temporarily sought
refuge in technical definitions of sexual conduct in an effort to escape the
law. Clinton denied a "sexual relationship" with "that woman" on national
television because he could honestly say he never had experienced full
penetration penile-vaginal intercourse with Lewinsky. Wilde denied that
he was a sodomite because he could honestly say that he did not practice
penile-anal intercourse with Lord Douglas. 73
To lie about sex in such a fashion, to walk on the "Wilde" side, a
person must possess character traits and status not shared by everyone.
Perhaps one has to feel and be very powerful, and enjoy taking risks. But,
perhaps one need only have a very strong urge to be the genuine person
behind the masks donned for public roles and private responsibilities.
Wilde emerges as more sympathetic than Clinton because conventional
morality increasingly regards legally enforced homophobia as unjust, but
continues to regard monogamy as a legitimate requirement of marriage.
A recent film version of Wilde's life paints Wilde sympathetically as a tragic
hero, a gifted genius in love with someone who did not deserve his love.74
Similarly, Primary Colors, a veiled film version of Clinton's presidential cam-
paign, paints Clinton as a tragic hero, a brilliant communicator with a
pathetic weakness for illicit sex and greasy food.75
VI. PRIVACY AND THE FIXATION OF MEANING
We must grapple with the following question: if you take privacy seri-
ously, as many experts say we ought, don't you have to make a virtue out of
telling lies to protect privacy?76 Shall we ascribe a right to lie in response
to prying, snooping and prejudiced questions; a right to lie to protect in-
formation about, and distortions of, the details of our sexual practices?
Shall we extend that right to public officials and public figures to the same
73. See ELLMANN, supra note 62, at 461 (stating that Wilde did not practice
"buggery" as such).
74. See Renee Graham, Born to Be Wilde: Stephen Fry Realizes Dream to Play Au-
thor, BOSTON GLOBE, May 31, 1998, at Ell (analyzing actor who portrayed Wilde
and briefly describing Wilde's lifestyle).
75. SeeJohn Walsh, The Big Picture-All Too Black and White, INDEP. (London),
Oct. 29, 1998, at 11 (criticizing film and noting instance of political
"schmoozing").
76. See Michael J. Chandler & Jamie Afifi, On Making a Virtue Out of Telling
Lies, 63 Soc. REs. 731, 731 (1996) (noting that good lie deserves certain amount of
respect).
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extent as ordinary citizens and resist the temptation to dismiss the prob-
lem quickly with the fiction that public officials and public figures "waive"
their rights to privacy by thrusting themselves into the limelight?
A large amount of philosophical, jurisprudential and psychological
literature argues that privacy, including sexual privacy, is important.
77
Philosophers ascribe to privacy a utilitarian and deontic value tied to au-
tonomy, independence, self-expression, love, friendship, bodily integrity,
judgment and democracy. Jurisprudential scholars stress privacy's value as
it relates to limiting government and democratic rights. 78 Psychologists
say privacy is key to our well-being, which is characterized by the reduction
of social anxieties. 79
Sexual privacy is a vehicle and domain for self-expression. It is a
realm in which excessive self-consciousness and conventionality can inter-
fere with the pursuit of intimacy through genuine efforts to please and be
pleased;- a realm that can be diminished by accountability and ridicule.
Imagine having to explain why one is attracted only to blonds or needs to
hear gospel music to achieve an orgasm. Imagine trying to explain why
you prefer phone sex with a near stranger to spending time with your wife.
Sex is an area in which we encounter our desires, prejudices and shame,
and cloak these emotions in privacy. Society can be hypocritical about sex,
often criminalizing some of the very things consenting adults find most
exciting. Privacy allows us to flout social and legal hypocrisy without pay-
ing a penalty. Sex in private is a realm in which we can come to see our-
selves as we really are and find greater self-awareness; for achieving
intimacy sometimes demands self-revelation and the abandonment of ha-
bitual patterns of self-deception.
The tastes, preferences, styles and habits we exhibit in sexual intimacy
will usually deserve the protection of privacy norms and conditions. Sex-
related violence and aggression must be brought to light, treated and pun-
ished. At least some of the interest in knowing the details of the Lewinsky
affair was prompted by the concern about whether the President was guilty
of sexual harassment in the White House or abused the power of his of-
fice. It is a shame that we had to find this out through secret tape record-
ings, forced testimony and DNA testing.8 0
Sometimes we lie because we do not expect other people to appreci-
ate what we regard as our true identities and the private lives in which our
77. See Allen, Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 153-55 (providing discussion
of scholarly books and articles relating to privacy).
78. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 IARv. L. REv. 737, 737
(1989) (finding that right to privacy is connected to "the legitimate limits of gov-
ernmental power").
79. See CARL D. SCHNEIDER, SHAME, ExposuRE, AND PRivAcy 41 (1977) (arguing
that privacy is necessary for maintenance and improvement of self and noting that
private sphere allows one to relax).
80. See Starr Report, supra note 3, at 50, 54 (indicating that DNA tests showed
that semen on Monica Lewinsky's dress was President Clinton's).
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true identities emerge. Sometimes we lie because telling the truth can
lead to rejection, ridicule, censure or punishment. Lying can keep the
world out and allow us to escape the offensive meanings others assign to
our conduct. It may be easier to say, "I'm allergic to shell fish," a lie, than
to reveal that one belongs to a religious minority reviled as a radical vege-
tarian cult. It may be easier to say, "I'm not a lesbian," when one is indeed
a lesbian, than to invite disapproval, rejection or even beatings.8 1
Keeping conduct private is a way to escape having to see oneself in
the shameful, hateful and ridiculous terms that others may see us.
Although nearly every adult engages in some type of sexual activity, we all
have unique combinations of acts, habits, emotions, language, styles, props
and tastes that are our own. Disclosure of our sexual selves could under-
cut our ability to be our sexual selves. Disclosure may make the sexual
conduct or partnerships we once enjoyed impractical. Disclosure may sub-
ject us to shame and ridicule or decrease our ability to experience joy and
intimacy our way. After the Starr Report and the impeachment, it is un-
likely that Clinton will ever again enjoy the role of Monica Lewinsky's ci-
gar-toting lover, "Handsome," without feeling ridiculous. 82
These considerations about the importance of privacy and sexual ex-
pression help explain what is going on when powerful men seek refuge in
technical definitions of sex in lieu of truth-telling. They are trying to fight
off the imposition of others' interpretations of their identities and con-
duct. Oscar Wilde denied that he was a sodomite because he wanted to
disassociate himself from the negative connotations of homosexuality in
the minds of those who disapproved of it and were disgusted by it. He
disliked the derogatory meanings others in his society brought to their
understandings of homosexuality: depravity, filth, frivolity and godless-
ness. In his own mind, he was participating in the "New Aestheticism," a
realm of intellectual and spiritual beauty higher than ethics itself.8 3 For
him, intimacy with young men was not reducible to particular sexual acts
or to fecal stains on a sheet. These "Greek" relationships, as he under-
stood them, were part intellectual, part aesthetic, part pedagogical, part
paternal and part erotic. The parts formed an inseparable whole. Wilde
felt as though Queensberry, who sought him out at a theater and club, was
intentionally destroying his private life. Wilde wrote to a friend that his
"whole life seems ruined by this man. The tower of ivory is assailed by the
foul thing. On the sand is my life spilt."8 4 Wilde lied because he was un-
81. See Ruben Castaneda, Hate Crimes Laws Rely on Motives, Not Targets: Laurel
Slaying Illustrates Fine Line, WASH. PosT, Oct. 26, 1998, at DI (noting that antigay
violence has created call for national hate crime legislation).
82. See Starr Report, supra note 3, at 60-61, 93, 107, 139 (indicating that Ms.
Lewinsky testified that she called President Clinton "Handsome," President Clin-
ton inserted cigar into her vagina and she and President Clinton had phone sex on
10 to 15 occasions).
83. See ELLMANN, supra note 62, at 305-06 (commenting on psyche of Wilde).
84. Id. at 438-39.
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able through force of character and art to persuade an entire society of
what he thought was the true nature and significance of his relationships
with men, and unable to get his wife, the world or Queensberry to see
these relationships' true meaning and his true identity. Wilde lied to keep
his private world and his self-esteem intact. He did not enjoy the lies that
he repeated to his own lawyer, but they seemed necessary. 85
President Clinton lied because he believed there was no post-feminist
interpretation of his extra-marital affair with a young intern that the pub-
lic would accept uncritically. His relationship could be construed as the
sexual exploitation of a young female subordinate, or worse, as sexual har-
assment, PaulaJones style.86 For Clinton, I conjecture, the meaning of his
affair was harmless and represented consensual titillation, sexual gratifica-
tion, fun, diversion and friendship. Lying was an effort to preserve a pri-
vate domain in which those meanings of the affair could flourish. I have
known nonmonogamous married couples who lied to most acquaintances
about their arrangements because they did not expect other people to
understand the real meaning of their conduct-whether loyal, liberating,
fun, expressive, intimacy-expanding or experimental. Indeed, despite all
the talk of Bill lying to Hillary and betraying her, for all we know, the
President and his wife shared a private "meaning community" in which
affairs were allowed and not considered a breach of their mutual
commitments.
Given the importance of privacy and sexual privacy just described, is it
always morally permissible to lie to someone making inquiries about one's
sex life? The answer is surely no. Parents, spouses and partners may, by
virtue of their responsibilities and our commitments to them, have a right
to know the details of our sex lives. A more plausible principle than "one
has a right to lie in response to all inquiries into one's sex life" is the
principle that "one has a right to lie in response to all unjustified inquiries
into one's sex life." Nonetheless, even this principle seems too strong and
too simplistic. What inquiries will be unjustified? Consider an example
involving sexual harassment. In the context of sexual harassment in the
workplace, for example, rebuffing rude, invasive questions with falsifica-
tions seems morally acceptable. Are you busy tonight? Is your husband
out of town? Do you like dirty movies? You know how to show a guy a
good time, right? In the above situation, falsification would seem appro-
priate and certainly not unethical.
Suppose, however, you are a gay man on an airplane and you strike
up a conversation with the stranger next to you who asks if you are gay.
85. See id. (interpreting scope of Wilde's lies). Wilde wrote to Douglas and
stated: "What is loathsome to me is the memory of interminable visits paid by me
to the solicitor ... when you and I would sit with serious faces telling serious lies to
a bald man . . . ." Id. at 439.
86. In early November 1998, without admitting wrongdoing or apologizing,
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Further, suppose you are a straight black woman and the person beside
you asks if you date white men, not as a come on, but because he wants to
know more about your social perspectives solely for purposes of the con-
versation. Perhaps the right thing to do in these cases is to answer hon-
estly, but then explain that you believe posing such questions is akin to
prying. From the perspective of progressive liberals, proudly affirming ho-
mosexuality and racial tolerance when one can do so safely better serves
the truth-teller and his or her society.
What if you are a candidate for a seat on the Supreme Court and you
are asked by the Senate Judiciary Committee whether you enjoy viewing
sexual pornography? Should you answer truthfully?8 7 This highly per-
sonal question seems improper when put exclusively to the second black
man in history with a chance at a seat on the Supreme Court. Refusal to
answer could be read as an admission, equaling "sudden death" for the
candidate. Denial may be the ambitious candidate's only practical option.
A judicial candidate ought not to have to reveal his or her sexual tastes,
particularly lawful ones, to others as a condition of holding a public office.
No one has a right to such information. It is not self-evident, however,
that one therefore has a right to lie, that one ought to lie or that lying is
more ethical under the circumstances than refusing to answer or telling
the truth. Willingness to speak the truth, even when it is embarrassing,
damaging and sought without good cause, may be a self-destructive virtue
we expect of public officials.
The morality of the situation is not self-evident; the psychology, how-
ever, is. In the past, we were reared to expect that we could properly do
certain things in private without public accountability. When the privacy
ethics under which we are reared clash with a novel tell-all ethic of hard-
ball politics and mass media journalism, we are unsettled. We may find
ourselves unable to humiliate and shame ourselves with truth-telling. We
may lie as a result, and who really can blame us? I believe Justice Clarence
Thomas did all of the things Anita Hill alleged; however, I do not entirely
blame him for not acknowledging it to the Senate.8 8
It is easy to understand, and, therefore, hard to fault, some lying. Ly-
ing is an ordinary strategy. We all know it. This is why the public did not
turn en masse against President Clinton. He should not have had the affair,
but his efforts to cover it up with lies to friends, family and strangers are
what you would expect from someone who stands to lose so much self-
esteem and prestige. Regrettably for the President, his transparent lies
caused Mr. Starr to seek very intimate details of his sexual habits to dis-
prove his story and, once those details were collected, Starr made the case
87. See Michael Wines, The Thomas Nomination: Compelling Evidence on Both
Sides, But Only One Can Be Telling Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at A20 (indicat-
ing that polygraph test bolstered Anita Hill's case, particularly her claim that
Thomas talked about pornography and sex acts).
88. See ANITA HILL, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER 222-24 (1997) (explaining de-
tails of favorable polygraph examination that Anita Hill passed).
[Vol. 44: p. 161
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss2/1
LYING TO PROTECT PRIVACY
that they should be revealed to the public. But who among us could easily
bear, with grace, having the raw details of his or her sex life exposed for all
to read about?
An important issue raised by the Clinton impeachment was whether
the President lied under oath. In a secular legal system, oath-taking is
symbolic. Few Americans today believe, as their common law predecessors
may have, that they place their mortal souls on the line by making false
statements under oath. It should not be surprising then, given the func-
tions of privacy, that people will lie, mislead others and omit facts to main-
tain privacy, even under oath. Ironically, a person threatened with having
her intimate life scrutinized in an official government forum has the great-
est incentive of all to attempt the good lie. We should expect lies, omis-
sions, equivocations, dissembling and so on of persons rightly or wrongly
put in such a situation.
Many legal doctrines recognize that requiring people to be truthful
about matters they deem very private compromises privacy interests and
invites dissimulation. One of the goals of the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination is the protection of privacy. The attorney-client,
physician-patient, clergy-penitent, psychotherapist-patient and spousal
privileges all have goals of protecting the privacy of individuals. The
Supreme Court recently narrowed the "exculpatory no" doctrine, which
immunized from criminal liability persons who make certain false state-
ments.89 The surviving doctrine presupposes the temptation to lie when
the truth will almost surely lead to prosecution and conviction.
VII. THE PROBLEM OF CELEBRITY
Men and women of special genius or charisma can sometimes get the
world to accept their interpretations of reality or to embrace their mean-
ings. Oscar Wilde brought such transformative genius to his stories and
plays.90 Success in one domain, however, does not always translate in to
success in another. While the impulse to set one's own meanings is as
understandable as it is strong, it is not realistic for celebrities to expect
that they will be able to do the same. Their lives are scrutinized too
closely. Like artists, politicians are creators of meaning. A charismatic
political leader can stand before a crowd and say, "Happy days are here
again," and begin, by his words, to make it true.9 1 For powerful celebrities
in every field, the hubris of expecting to impose one's own meanings on
89. See Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 811-12 (1998) (holding that
"exculpatory no" exception does not apply with respect to criminal liability under
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) for making false statements).
90. See, e.g., RICHARD ALDINGTON, THE PORTABLE OSCAR WILDE 1 (1946) (dis-
cussing varying opinions of Wilde, including claim that "he was the greatest ...
writer of the nineteenth century").
91. See HAROLD EvANs, THE AMERICAN CENTURY 241, 246 (1998) (noting that
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morally controversial and intimate behavior is fueled by the expectations
of success that have been enjoyed in other domains of life. But in areas of
sexual morality, it is hard to succeed if one is ahead of one's time. Such
was the case with Wilde, who lived in an era of homosexual repression,
facing several harsh criminal libel laws.
Celebrity makes privacy and the strategy of lying to protect privacy less
available. It also makes the strategy of not talking to avoid the need to lie
less available. 92 Famous politicians and top public officials work and play
before the eyes of the media, body guards and staff. They face a variety of
people in journalism and law enforcement whose professional duties are
to not take anyone's word at face value. Consequently, some political ce-
lebrities find it prudent to be squeaky clean or extremely careful and, in
doing so, may falsify their actual preferences to fit in.9 3
VIII. TRUST
Trust, "a fragile good," according to Sissela Bok, is an issue for Ameri-
can democracy. 94 The men and women elected to public office are sup-
posed to represent the interests of their constituencies. The public needs
to be able to trust elected and appointed officials to do what they are
elected to do. The Vietnam War, the Watergate Affair, the Iran-Contra
Affair and the Clinton-Lewinsky Affair all illustrate that the President and
his closest advisors cannot be trusted absolutely.95 They are capable of
crimes, cover-ups, omissions and outright lies. Outside of Washington,
politicians and officials disappoint as well. They lie, distort, steal, cheat on
their spouses, sexually harass women, demean minorities, abuse drugs and
alcohol, evade taxes, accept bribes, hire undocumented workers, and as-
sault, plot to kill and, occasionally, actually kill their adversaries. 96
92. See BAILEY, supra note 5, at 71 ("Public opinion is not easily avoided. If you
... try to opt out of the game and be neither a talker nor a listener, the penalty is
to be considered . . . not part of the community.").
93. See KURAN, supra note 28, at 11 (explaining dynamics of lying to protect
oneself and to fit in). Kuran states:
Talk being cheap, anyone can claim to be against this lifestyle or that
political platform. An effective way of making such a claim credible is to
participate in efforts to punish those from whom one is seeking dissocia-
tion. A closeted homosexual may become a gay basher to allay suspicions
about his own private life .... [H]ypocrisy is a universal, and often suc-
cessful, tactic of self-protection and self-promotion.
Id.
94. See Bok, Lies Come With Consequences, supra note 6, at Cl (noting that pub-
lic's trust in elected officials is necessary for effective government, but leaves these
officials susceptible to corruption).
95. See ORMAN, supra note 17, at 4 (identifying deception as prime characteris-
tic of modern presidency).
96. See Bruce Frankel & Bill Hewitt, Only in America What Hath Election Day
Wrought? A Wrestler, a Brother Act and a Speaker Made Speechless, PEoPLE, Nov. 23,
1998, at 61 (explaining that unless Burks's widow ran as write-in candidate, Looper
would win by default). The late Tennessee State Senator Tommy Burks was mur-
dered two weeks before the November 1998 election and police charged Byron
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It is hard to quantify trust or to say just how much trust the U.S. polit-
ical order. requires to remain effective and legitimate. Ascertaining the
amount of trust Americans actually place in officials is not easy. Polls only
reach a small segment of the population, and the answers people give to
pollsters may overstate or understate their actual feelings. On the one
hand, several trends could suggest a perilously low level of trust in govern-
ment: the tone of political discourse is often cynical; the number of people
interested in engaging in serious political discussion is small; voter turnout
is low, compared.to other democracies; and antigovernment activism is
flourishing. On the other hand, I suspect the vast majority of people living
in the United States would say that government is legitimate and effective,
and that they can rely on it. It does reliably offer them security and serv-
ices worth having. Although it is commonplace to interpret low voter
turnout as a sign of disenchantment and disengagement with politics, one
might also read it as evidence that those entitled to vote actually do trust
that the candidates will adequately serve their needs. Indeed, I believe
that most people in the United States, despite their sometimes vociferous
complaints, feel very secure with their government. They do not necessar-
ily believe all public officials are always ethical and fair, but they do believe
that they are, on the whole, mostly ethical and fair enough.
When philosophers assert that lies by public officials erode trust, they
are resting on a time-honored axiom that workable cooperative enter-
prises require participants to be truthful, trustworthy and reliable. The
axiom is doubtlessly true, but does not entail that workable cooperative
enterprises will fall apart if leaders are sometimes not truthful about mat-
ters of direct relevance to their official duties.9 7 In addition, it certainly
does not entail that workable cooperative enterprises must fall apart if
leaders are sometimes not truthful about matters that the public may
deem tangential to their official duties, such as sex, and that are well-un-
derstood as matters in which moral failure and lapses in judgment are
ordinary and predictable. I am suggesting that the conclusion that lying
about sex erodes trust in public officials overlooks how much the U.S. pub-
lic of today and yesterday understands and discounts sex and privacy-re-
lated deception. 98
Secrecy and deception about national programs and policies are com-
ponents of presidential power.99 Many presidents, including some of the
"Low Tax" Looper, Burks's opponent in the election, with the murder. See id. To
prevent the jailed Looper from winning the election by default, the dead man's
widow ran in his place and garnered 96% of the vote as a write-in candidate. See id.
97. See Mothersill, supra note 28, at 924-25 (disagreeing with position that ly-
ing causes deception to become "a way of life").
98. See Poll, Roper Center at the University of Connecticut, Question No. 005
(1998) (noting that in recent puiblic opinion poll, 49% of respondents said that
they thought president would be justified in lying to protect privacy of his family,
46% said he would not be justified in lying and 5% said they "did not know").
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greatest presidents, falsified and concealed important personal facts from
the American people during their terms in office. Thomas Jefferson's se-
cret was Sally Hemings, a black slave by whom he bore a child;100 Grover
Cleveland's secret was an out-of-wedlock son named Oscar, whose sane
mother Cleveland had committed to an insane asylum;10 1 Warren Har-
ding's secret was a mistress smuggled into White House closets for sex, and
their daughter, Elizabeth Ann, whom Harding declined ever to see or to
support; 10 2 Woodrow Wilson's secrets were dyslexia, a series of strokes and
an extra-marital affair with Mary Peck; 10 3 Franklin Roosevelt's secrets were
a mistress and a bout with polio that left him completely unable to walk;10 4
John F. Kennedy's secrets were addictions to drugs and sex;10 5 and Ronald
Reagan's secret, sadly visible before he left office, was Alzheimer's
disease. 10
6
Sissela Bok raises the following series of key questions: "Why . ..
should lying to the public not be ... legitimate, in cases of persistent and
intrusive probing? What is it that turns an official's lie to the public into a
matter of public concern, no matter how rightfully private the subject of
the lie itself?"1 0 7 Her answer is that "the credibility of public officials is
crucial in a democracy."108 Bok further states that "[a]ppeals to privacy
can be exploited to cover up wrongdoing just as much as national security
100. See Patrick Rogers et al., All Tom's Children: A President's Presumed Affair
With a Slave Gives New Meaning to the Term Jeffersonian, PEOPLE, Nov. 23, 1998, at 77
(noting that DNA test conducted at Oxford University indicated that Jefferson fa-
thered child with one of his slaves).
101. See EVANS, supra note 91, at 31 (noting that Republicans hoped that dis-
closure of Cleveland's out-of-wedlock son would cost him presidency in 1884).
102. See id. at 201 (describing Harding's secret relationship with Nan Britton
and his daughter Elizabeth whom he never saw and how story was published de-
spite attempts of suppression).
103. See Ford Burkhart, Edwin A. Weinstein, 89, Neuropsychiatrist Who Studied
President Wilson, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1998, at B12 (noting that deceased neuropsy-
chiatrist believed that President Wilson's denial of illnesses contributed to presi-
dential problems).
104. See EVANS, supra note 91, at 243 ("Few ... knew how crippled he was.
The press respected his privacy. The public did not see pictures . . ").
105. See SEYMOUR M. HERSH, THE DARK SIDE OF CAMELOT 229-30 (1997) (em-
phasizing President John F. Kennedy's sex-filled private life and its effect on peo-
ple around him).
106. See Burkhart, supra note 103, at B12 (indicating that physician who stud-
ied Reagan's presidency concluded that he suffered from Alzheimer's symptoms,
like loss of memory, that left him frequently unaware of world affairs); see also Me-
linda Beck, Alzheimer's Terrible Toll NEWSWEEK, Oct. 2, 1995, at 36 (stating that Rea-
gan privately worried about his failing memory and once failed to recognize
member of his own cabinet); M.J. Zuckerman, Bush: Reagan Wasn't Ill as President,
USA TODAY, Nov. 29, 1996, at 2A (stating that historians and others wonder
whether Reagan's failing memory during his term as president was related to
Alzheimer's).
107. Bok, Lies Come With Consequences, supra note 6, at C1.
108. Id.
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can ...."109 Moreover, she makes the slippery slope argument that lies
lead to further lies, lies by the liar and lies by those who emulate the
liar.110 Bok states finally that "when distrust becomes too overpowering
within a family, a community or a nation, it becomes impossible to meet
joint needs."'11 Addressing the duties of public officials in this area, Bok
finds that in exchange for the privileges that they have been granted,
"public servants, doctors, clergy, lawyers, bankers, journalists and other
professionals have a special responsibility" to "consider to what extent
their actions erode or help restore this social good of trust."112
Bok's most powerful argument is that, for the sake of trust, public
officials have a special obligation to avoid deception regarding their pri-
vate lives, even when their private lives have been perhaps unjustly probed.
Notice that Bok rejects the justice-of-lying-to-the-unjust principle as ap-
plied to public officials. She also avoids the fiction that public figures
waive privacy and expectations of privacy by thrusting themselves into the
limelight. My response to Bok is to agree that trust is vital, but to disagree
that trust in government hinges crucially on officials never lying to protect
privacy. In some contexts, "deliberate deception need not in general pose
a significant threat to trust."1 13 This is not to say that we should take pride
in lies and liars, particularly those whose reckless behavior greatly affects
the efficiency of two branches of the national government, and subject our
nation to ridicule. We should, however, take pride in our capacity for em-
pathetic understanding of the realm of sexuality as a realm of propriety
and impropriety, of a mixture of communal and self-defined modes of
intimacy and expression that may or may not conform to social expecta-
tions. A significant segment of the public appears to accept the notion
that a president is justified in lying to protect the privacy of his or her
family.11
4
I defend the right of presidents and other public officials to have pri-
vate lives sometimes defended by deception. This is not to advocate lying
on national television and under oath without conscience and concern for
consequences. Privacy is a context for correcting, as well as making, sexu-
ally related mistakes. Suppose an official has an extra-marital affair, con-
fesses it to his or her spouse in private and begins to rebuild their
marriage in earnest. To deny the affair to the public in an effort to avoid
further damage to a marriage is not plainly immoral, and not plainly the
kind of deception that, if found out, would significantly erode public trust
in government or invite more lies. In a best-selling practical guide to
109. Id.
110. See id. (explaining cyclical effects of repeated lies).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Jackson, supra note 14, at 5-9.
114. For a further review of the results of the poll conducted by the Roper
Center at the University of Connecticut on whether a president is justified in lying
to protect the privacy of his family, see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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truth-telling in personal relationships, Dr. Harriet Lerner asserts that peo-
ple seek privacy primarily to protect their dignity and ultimate separate-
ness as human beings, rather than to fool others or engage in acts of
deception.1 15 For this reason, she argues, we can proudly speak of and
exercise our rights to privacy. 116 When it comes to lying to protect pri-
vacy, however, Lerner's neat dichotomy breaks apart, for in these contexts,
we seek both to fool and to protect our dignity and separateness.
Adrienne Rich suggests that even lying justified by an appeal to pri-
vacy can be a product of cowardice and an attempt to "short-cut through
another's personality."1 17 Because of his manipulative behavior and his
cowardice, I do not defend President Clinton's handling of his private life.
In my estimation, Clinton was wrong to involve himself with Lewinsky in
the shadow of the Paula Jones case, in the corridors of the White House
and in the context of a very public marriage. Having walked on the
"Wilde" side, he was wrong to go further down that road by desperately
and pathetically using the public airways and government employees to
further his deception. It was almost as if the President thought.he was a
private citizen lying to a gullible spouse behind closed doors, circa 1958,
rather than the most watched and investigated man on the planet lying to
the planet in 1998.
IX. CONCLUSION
As Leonard Saxe astutely observed, "this seems to have become a soci-
ety in which lying is endemic, but in which a Victorian-like attitude is also
maintained that heavily sanctions those who are caught in prevarica-
tion."11 8 To this, I might add, that ours' seems to be a society in which
extra-marital sex is endemic, but in which a Victorian-like attitude is main-
tained that severely sanctions those who are caught in adultery. It is time
to embrace openly a less hypocritical, more consistent set of norms that
would make lying about sex seem less necessary.
My conclusion is threefold. First, telling the truth is better than lying,
most of the time. This is especially true in institutional settings where a
high degree of trust and loyalty are essential. 119 Lying can undermine
trust, render information unreliable. and entail disrespect for persons.
115. See HARRIET LERNER, THE DANCE OF DECEPTION 36-37 (1993) (arguing
that protecting one's body and decisions regarding one's body from intrusion by
others may be matter of privacy or secrecy).
116. See id. (discussing underlying motives of why individuals seek privacy).
117. See ADRIENNE RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS AND SILENCE 185-92 (1979) (exam-
ining psychological underpinnings of lying).
118. Saxe, supra note 48, at 410. Saxe also states, "A kind of hysteria about
dishonesty seems to have permeated our culture. Perhaps stimulated by pervasive
mendacity, we are quick to call others liars and frauds." Id. at 414.
119. See Steven L. Grover, Lying in Organizations: Theory, Research, and Future
Directions, in ANTIisociA. BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS 68, 69-70 (Robert A. Gia-
calone &Jerald Greenberg eds., 1997) (finding that lying can hinder how organi-
zations function and threaten trust underlying relationships in organizations).
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Second, the commonplace practice of lying to maintain privacy is some-
times a morally acceptable alternative to truth-telling. Third and finally,
for government to be trustworthy, it must show respect for the privacy of
ordinary citizens and public officials. Likewise, ordinary citizens and pub-
lic officials, because we run this nation together, must strive to make hon-
esty in their public roles and private lives a priority.
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